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INTRODUCTION
This paper draws on experience from the data-collection process in the American Dream
Demonstration (ADD) of Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) to make recommendations
for the design of monitoring of savings in a Children and Youth Savings Account Policy
Demonstration (CYSAPD). In ADD, thirteen community-based organizations were funded
through the Corporation for Enterprise Development (CFED) to design, implement, and run IDA
programs serving low-income people.
Developed by the Center for Social Development (CSD), a monitoring system know as MIS IDA
is used to collect participant- and program-level data at each sponsoring organization in ADD.
Monitoring means recording basic characteristics of participants and programs as well as
recording monthly cash flows through the accounts of each participant. Over the course of the
four-year demonstration, CSD has collected MIS IDA data every six months from the sponsoring
organizations to produce monitoring reports of the ongoing research. Results are in Sherraden et
al., 1999, Sherraden et al., 2000, and Schreiner et al., 2001.
Experience from monitoring in ADD offer a wealth of lessons for the design of monitoring and
evaluation in CYSAPD. This paper focuses on issues in two main areas: program design and
administration, and data collection.
PROGRAM DESIGN AND ADMINISTRATION
Design must be constrained to some degree because monitoring and the associated monitoring
instrument cannot accommodate infinite and arbitrary variation. There are three sources of
constraints: (1) What policy and research questions do we want the demonstration to address? (2)
What are the budget and other administrative or program-implementation constraints? (3) What
are the monitoring/information-system constraints?1 Following are program design and
administration issues regarding monitoring in CYSAPD.
Establish a match structure compatible with the demonstration. In ADD, some sponsoring
organizations attempted to use match structures that were incompatible with the structures
assumed in the demonstration and, therefore, incompatible with the monitoring system. In
CYSAPD, the monitoring system selected must be compatible with all program-design
specifications of the demonstration.
Restrict the use of collaboratives. Collaboratives are defined as a group of organizations each
running their own IDA program, but operated through one sponsoring organization. For
monitoring purposes, information is collected as a single data set from the sponsoring
organization.
With a collaborative, the assumption is that each organization within the collaborative has
similar program design, but this is not likely to be the case. For example, programmatic
1

For further discussion of management information systems, see Clancy, Johnson, and Schreiner, “Savings
Deposits, Match Structure, and Management Information Systems: Implications for Research on CYSAPD.”
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information may differ among the multiple IDA programs such that the collaborative cannot
really be viewed as a single program. The data-collection ability and effort varies among
members of a collaborative, making the data incomparable, even though the analysis must
assume that the data is of uniform quality. Thus, for CYSAPD, collaboratives are not
recommended at the experimental sites.
If collaboratives are permitted for other sites, all partners (not only the sponsoring organization)
should agree to the terms of a CYSAPD contract. It is also important to specify from the outset
what monitoring information will be the responsibility of the sponsoring organization and what
will be collected by the partner organization(s).
Staffing. In ADD, sponsoring organizations must make hard choices about whether to spend
time serving participants or managing data for evaluation. As might be expected, monitoring
tends to take a back seat to other responsibilities. One option may be for the evaluation itself to
hire a person to work at the experimental sites to manage monitoring and other CYSAPD
evaluation methods.

Develop an action plan for staff turnover. In ADD, turnover of full-time staff involved in data
collection has been high—often annual or even more frequently—and with each change,
monitoring suffers. In some instances, turnover has occurred because Vista volunteers have been
responsible for data collection in MIS IDA. One way to mitigate the setbacks suffered when
staff change would be to require a written plan stating how work will be transitioned and what
training and/or assistance from outside sources will be needed. In addition, sponsoring
organizations should not purposely place known short-term personnel (such as Vista volunteers)
in charge of data collection.
Implement electronic transfer of savings data. Using the current version of MIS IDA,
sponsoring organizations either manually input each participant’s monthly savings information,
or, simply electronically import savings data from their bank. Manual data entry is both time
consuming and introduces an opportunity for mistakes. CAPTC (the experimental site in ADD,
and thus the site most likely to resemble the two experimental sites in CYSAPD) states that they
would be unable to manage their ADD data without this function. Once enrollment is over, this
monthly key-punching is the most time-consuming part of data management for the sponsoring
organizations.
It is recommended that CYSAPD data-entry responsibilities be minimized. If MIS IDA is
selected as the information system, an electronic transfer of savings data must be required of the
experimental sites. Electronic data feeds from banks are also strongly encouraged for the nonexperimental sites because of the increased efficiency and accuracy.
The optimal situation is to eliminate the tracking of savings data from the responsibilities of the
sponsoring organization. Clancy (2001) proposes the use of a college savings plan program
manager’s services in CYSAPD to achieve this optimum. Whatever the monitoring system,
careful design is required for the method to enter or transmit financial data.
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Connect funding to contract fulfillment. Similar to ADD, the CYSAPD contract agreement
will include an outline of monitoring responsibilities of the sponsoring organization. The first
step to ensure contract fulfillment is to spell out data-collection responsibilities completely and
explicitly, and the second step is to have a mechanism in place for when commitments are
broken. Specific data-collection requirements might include: “On a monthly basis, enter
financial statements and check data condition by using quality-control product (ie. MIS IDA
QC); Send cleaned data files to the evaluator 45 days after each calendar quarter, etc.”
Continued receipt of CYSAPD funds ought to be conditional on successful completion of datacollection and research commitments.
In ADD, CFED requested semi-annual progress reports from the sponsoring organizations. Such
reports might also include questions directed to the organizations and the researchers about data
quality and reporting to ensure that data-collection responsibilities are being fulfilled.
DATA COLLECTION
Data collection is costly in terms of the time of participants, program staff, and research staff. In
ADD, data collection for the monitoring research was conducted in the field by staff of the IDA
programs, then aggregated by the research staff at CSD. Understanding the additional burdens
that data collection creates on an organization, it is important to reduce this effort to the extent
possible for CYSAPD. Experience in ADD argues for a more simplified process to collect
participant and program data, and provides lessons for concentrating data-collection resources on
the types of data with the greatest pay-offs. Four current MIS IDA data-collection categories are
noted, followed by recommendations for change in CYSAPD. Clancy, Johnson, and Schreiner
(2001) address collection of savings data (monthly cash flows).
•
•
•
•

Program design (initial design, and changes to design through time)
Program costs
Participant characteristics and participant income, assets and liabilities (at enrollment
and changes through time)
Hours of economic education

Track program design changes qualitatively. In ADD, program design varied among
programs, and it also varied through time for a given program (except at the experimental design
site where program design could not be changed). The idea was to allow programs to adjust as
they learned. This is a worthy principle, but experience in ADD suggests that design changes in
a given program often lead to different understandings of program rules among program
directors, staff, participants, etc. Like ADD, the program-design data should be collected in
writing at the time a sponsoring organization is selected for CYSAPD, but perhaps a qualitative
system for reporting is the best method to collect accurate program changes through time (for
example, through on-site visits or a semi-annual telephone survey).
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Although the demonstration should be flexible enough to allow for design alterations, changes
must be documented and clearly communicated to all parties involved. Design flexibility is a
distinct issue from clear communication and consensus on changes.
Program-design changes detract from what we can learn from the demonstration (even if
perfectly tracked and known) for both policy and research purposes, so changes are not allowed
at the experimental sites. In CYSAPD, it is recommended that any unforeseen necessary
alterations to program design at the experimental sites be documented in writing and approved
by the evaluation team before changes are communicated to participants and staff.
Limit collection of program costs. Most non-profit organizations do not have cost centers, so
cost data for the IDA programs run by the non-profit organizations are likely to be inaccurate. In
ADD, sponsoring organizations have a difficult time distinguishing ADD costs from all other
IDA program costs. Therefore, it is recommended that cost data be collected only at the
experimental design sites, with cost-benefit analysis.
Tailor participant characteristics to CYSAPD. ADD targets adults; the current proposal for
CYSAPD focuses on two groups, one that starts with children at age 3, and one with teens as
they enter the eighth grade. Since MIS IDA currently includes questions targeted to adults, a
revised set of questions will be needed that are relevant to the younger ages. Since participant
characteristics vary between children (the three year-old-group) and youth (the eighth-grade
group), two different instruments may be required.
Examples of possible CYSAPD participant characteristics which are not in MIS IDA are:
• Ethnicity of child and parent(s)
• Gender of child
• Employment of child and parent(s)
• Education (exact grade level of child, not a range as in ADD, and attainment of parent(s))
• Participation in extracurricular (school) activities
• Additional variables related specifically to children and youth
Do not collect data on the values of assets and liabilities. CSD collected asset and liability
information from all of the ADD participants but found the data to be incomplete and sometimes
unreliable (financial data is always very noisy, and participants in any case are reluctant to reveal
the information). Often participants simply do not know these values. For monitoring CYSAPD,
the lesson is to ask at enrollment only about the presence of different assets and liabilities, but
not their value. For example, “Do you (or your family) own a car, a home, a computer, etc.”,
“Do you have a car/home mortgage?”, and “Do you have student debt?”
Do not collect updates after enrollment. In ADD, staff members spent considerable time and
expense collecting and entering data on income, assets, and liabilities both at enrollment and
periodically after enrollment. The idea was to use this to measure “new savings” through time.
In CYSAPD, changes in demographics are best measured through the experimental research
method and programs should be spared this expense as part of the monitoring research.

Center for Social Development
Washington University in St. Louis

4

Track financial education through experimental design method. Sponsoring organizations in
ADD are required to collect financial-education data covering hours of sessions attended.
Financial-education data, because they are event-driven, are not always collected without
external reminders.
In CYSAPD, it is recommended that financial-education information be collected at the
experimental design sites only, through the survey questions and/or alternative data-collection
methods. Beverly and Clancy (2001) review key dimensions for research on financial education
for CYSAPD.
Keep monitoring and survey data distinct at the experimental sites. The questions in the
monitoring instrument will likely differ from the questions collected through the surveys
associated with the experimental design. In ADD, there was overlap in some questions asked.
In an effort to eliminate asking questions of participants twice, an attempt was made in the field
to enter data into MIS IDA that was collected from the baseline experimental design survey.
Unfortunately, some of the questions used for impact measurement were not exactly the same as
the questions used for monitoring.
Thus, as much as possible in CYSAPD, careful distinctions should be made between data
collection for monitoring and data collection for impact measurement. If some data collected for
impact measurement are to be used for monitoring, then the questions used should be identical
and the collector should be the same.
SUMMARY
Based on experience gained from monitoring ADD, recommendations are noted to inform the
CYSAPD monitoring process. Designers of CYSAPD can take advantage of lessons from ADD
to achieve greater efficiencies for the next demonstration of IDAs.
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